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1.  Introduction 
Output regulation is one of the key instruments to prevent overexploitation of 
fish resources in the Western world. Also in the European Union where regula-
tion by TAC has a prominent position in the Conservation policy. Enactment of 
the output regulation has the impact that it changes the cost and revenue of the 
industry participants. The behaviour of the firms in industry in response to the 
regulation is of importance to the regulators who are interested in the impacts 
on the industry structure as well as the economic performance of the firms. 
 
The methodology used relies on the principle of duality and flexible forms with 
competitive behaviour and regular technology; the theory of duality ensures 
consistency between the revenue and the production functions. The unregulated 
multispecies fisheries has been widely addressed in the literature by Squires 
(1987a, b), Kirkley and Strand (1988), and Bjørndal and Gordon (1993). The 
outline in the present paper is to estimate the technological conditions within an 
output-regulated fishery. This is accomplished by explicit to incorporate the 
impacts that the output regulation will have on the transformation between out-
puts in the industry. In the analysis to follow is emphasised the impact that a 
tightening/loosening of the output regulation will have on the unrestricted out-
puts. In this sense the paper offers information that is valuable to the regulators 
in order to predict the economic spillovers effects following output regulation 
in an industry of multiple outputs. 
 
A quadratic revenue function is applied to describe the transformation between 
outputs in the pelagic fishery in the North Sea/Skagerrak. The empirical result 
reveals that the pelagic fishery is a joint fishery and that both the output prices 
and the imposed regulation have had significant influence on the vessels’ pro-
duction pattern. The study shows that the imposed regulation on herring will 
have spillover effects on the reduction fishery, whereas the output regulation of 
the mackerel is not found to any impact on the production of the unrestricted 
output in the present application. 
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The study of pelagic fishery is organised as follows. In the section to follow is 
emphasised that conventional elasticities between unrestricted outputs is not 
appropriate to evaluate the economic i mpact of an output regulated industry. 
Section 1.3. describes the output regulation implemented to manage the pelagic 
fishery of the Danish trawlers. In section 1.4. is accomplished a discussion on 
different ways to model output regulation of the industry. The representation of 
the empirical model follows in section 1.5. The empirical results and estimated 
the own- and cross-price elasticities of the regulated industry are presented in 
sections 1.6.-1.7. The paper is finalised by discussing specific elements in the 
output regulation of the pelagic fishery.  
2.  The elasticity between restricted and unre-
stricted outputs in a regulated fishery  
Fisheries regulation, where the purpose is to avoid overexploitation is often ac-
complished by the use of output management. As emphasised in the studies of 
Squires (1987), Kirkley and Strand (1988), Alam, Omar and Squires (1996) the 
outcome of output management is critical depending on whether the industry 
can be characterised as a production of a single species or multiple species. 
Given that the fishery is characterised by a multispecies production it means 
that the industry can transform its production between multiple outputs. This 
could imply that output regulation of a single species would result in that the 
industry substitutes to other unregulated species.  
 
In the conventional studies of the unregulated multispecies industry, the firm is 
assumed to vary its output freely. In a model where all inputs are fixed in the 
short run, the firm chooses the mix of outputs that maximises its revenue. The 
quantity of variable and unrestricted outputs are denoted by Q =(Q1, Q2,…, Qn), 
the exogenous given output prices are denoted by P=(P1, P 2,…, P n), the fixed 
inputs are denoted by Z.  In the fishery of no output regulation the firm maxi-
mise the revenue function: 
 
(1)  )}, , ( ; { max ) ,... , ( 2 1 Z Q Q P P P P R Q Q n =   
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where PQ and Q represents the vectors of respectively the output prices (market 
prices) and output quantities. By applying Hotelling’s lemma, the revenue func-
tion can be transformed into output supply functions for the unrestricted out-
puts. In the studies of the fisheries without output regulation, the output supply 
functions have been applied to estimate own- and cross price elasticities for the 
unrestricted outputs. This is based on the assumption that the supplied outputs 
are depending on the exogenous market prices for outputs. The transformation 
between the unrestricted outputs that is to state whether the outputs are substi-
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which describes how an incremental change in the price of output m, Pm, affects 
the quantity supplied of output i, Qi. Given that no output regulation is imposed 
on the fishery, the elasticity in (2) would be feasible to describe the optimal be-
haviour of the fishermen. 
 
In practise the majority of fisheries in the western world are restricted by output 
regulation. This imply that the fishermen do not have the possibility to trans-
form between the restricted outputs based on market prices. In this sense the 
revenue function expressed in (1) should be revised to: 
 
(3) R P P P P Q Q Y Z n Q Q ( , ,... ) max { ;( , , )}, 1 2 =  
 
where Y represents the restricted outputs of the firm. The firm is still maximis-
ing its revenue but only in the sub-space of the unrestricted outputs. In this 
sense the elasticities employed in (2) are only describing the transformation be-
tween the unrestricted outputs and thereby ignores the impact of the output 
regulation. However, as outlined by Dupont (1991) the elasticity between the 
restricted and unrestricted variables, denoted by the elasticity of intensity, pro-
vides information that is valuable to describe the technological condition within  
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a regulated industry. In the present context the elasticity of intensity is used to 
describe the spillover effect that the output regulation will have on the unregu-
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The elasticity measures the impact that an incremental change of regulated out-
put, Yh, will have on the supply of the unregulated output, Qi, given that the ex-
ogenous market prices Pi, Pm are held constant. A negative elasticity of intensity 
indicates that a tightening of the output regulation would be compensated by an 
increase in the supply of the unrestricted output, whereas a positive elasticity 
indicates a complementary relationship between the regulated and the unregu-
lated outputs. The latter situation will have the implication that a tightening of 
the output regulation will also reduce the industry’s supply of the unrestricted 
outputs. In this sense the elasticity of intensity embody information that can be 
used to predict the output transformation that will occur under output regulation 
of a multiproduct industry.  
3.  The Pelagic Fishery in Denmark 
The management of herring and mackerel in the Danish North Sea fisheries is 
traditionally based on individual quotas (catch permission), which are defined 
on a monthly (mackerel) or 120 days basis (herring) and give each vessel the 
right to catch a certain quantity within the defined period. In 1994 management 
of the herring and mackerel fisheries changed from quotas on a  short-termed 
seasonal level to quotas defined on a common yearly basis
2 for herring and 
                                                                 
2  The management of the individual quota system between 1994 and 1996 is stated in procla-
mation number 244, 7th April 1994 and proclamation number 981, 7th December 1994; proc-
lamation number 920, 5th December 1995.  
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mackerel.
3 The individual quota system put into force in the herring fisheries in 
1994 cover the areas, Skagerrak, the North Sea, and the English Channel. The 
individual quota system in force for the mackerel fisheries cover the North Sea, 
Skagerrak, Kattegat, and the Danish quota in the Norwegian zone north of 
62￿N, and the Danish quota in the zone of the Faroe Islands. 
 
The individual quotas are distributed among the vessels applying to participate 
in either herring fisheries or both herring and mackerel fisheries. The Ministry 
of Fisheries supplies the quotas without charge or fee; transferability of the quo-
tas between vessels is not permitted, which means that there is no market where 
quotas are traded. The individual quota give the right to catch a certain quantity 
within the current year. The quota is distributed to each vessel depending on its 
size and its share in previous years’ total Danish landings of herring and mack-
erel from the relevant fishing zones. In general, the quotas are defined for her-
ring and mackerel. However, the individual vessel can be given permission to 
have a minor by-catch of reduction fish in the herring fisheries if the reduction 
catch is  separated from the herring catch. This dispensation in the individual 
quota system is of significant importance to the trawlers, which have a minor 
catch of reduction species in their catch. Given that a vessel has caught 70% of 
its individual initial quota, it can apply for a bonus quota, which constitutes a 
maximum of 10% of the vessel’s initial quota. The Ministry of Fisheries has the 
obligation to reduce a vessel’s individual quota if the opportunity to utilise the 
quota is neglected by the vessel. The vessel’s quota can be reduced by up 30% 
of the uncaught quota, which will have an impact on the vessel’s quota in the 
year to come. Although the vessels have individual quotas in herring and mack-
erel fisheries, the vessels are still entitled to catch other species in accordance 
with the general regulation of these species.   
 
                                                                 
3  For completeness it is noted that a minor part of the herring and mackerel catch in the North 
Sea region are regulated by catch per fishing trip. Only 15% of the catches of herring and 
mackerel in 1994-1996 were regulated as catch per fishing trip. It is emphasised that the firms 
analysed in the present paper are regulated by annual quota licenses and no effort manage-
ment has been imposed on the firms.   
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Only the large trawlers that have individual quotas in the herring and mackerel 
fisheries in the North Sea /Skagerrak are covered in the study
4. The trawlers 
contain two groups firms.  The first group covers the firms that have only ap-
plied for annual licenses in herring fishery, these firms have not applied for a 
license in the mackerel but they are still allowed to a minor catch of mackerel 
on a monthly basis. The second group of trawlers contain the firms that have 
both applied for annual licenses in the herring and in mackerel fishery. Finally 
it should be emphasised that the trawlers are seen as very flexible; i.e. the 
trawlers are not entirely dependent on the catches of herring and mackerel. The 
trawlers are able to change fishing strategy depending e.g. on the relative prices 
of the species, because they have the potential to switch between catch of her-
ring, mackerel, reduction species, and to some degree to other consumption 
fish. The trawlers normally have a large share of their earnings in the reduction 
fisheries. In general the trawlers are not restricted in their catch of either reduc-
tion fish or in their catch of other consumption species. 
4.  Discussion of the Theoretical Model 
The use of flexible forms of the profit or the revenue function has shown to 
successful in describing output transformations in production characterised by 
multiple outputs. That is, based on the a ssumption of either profit or revenue 
maximisation the conditional output supply can be derived by applying Hotel-
ling’s lemma. The flexible dual approach has found many applications in fisher-
ies that is based on the assumptions of exogenous prices and absence of output 
regulation to describe the substitution possibilities between inputs and outputs 
(Squires (1987), Kirkley and Strand (1988) and others).  
 
The presence of output regulation in the applied industry has the implication 
that the output mix can not be determined by the exogenous prices because 
binding output restrictions means that the firm is no allowed to increase its sup-
ply to respond an increase in the exogenous price. The quota restriction has the 
                                                                 
4  The study concerns the large trawlers that are located in the ports of Esbjerg, Hirtshals, 
Skagen, and Thyborøn. The purse seiners, which participate in pelagic fishery are not in-
cluded in the present study.  
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impact that the firm is limited in its revenue maximisation because the output of 
the firm tend to be predetermined. In this sense the firm is instead facing a cost-
minimising problem for given levels of outputs. The application of the cost 
minimisation devise to describe the technological conditions in the output regu-
lated fishery has been employed by Lipton and Strand (1992) and Bjørndal and 
Gordon (1998). A potential problem in using the cost minimisation approach to 
describe output regulation is that it is not certain that all participating firms in 
the industry are r estricted by the output regulation. This could imply that the 
unrestricted firms should be modelled by a revenue maximisation approach, 
whereas the restricted firms should be modelled by a cost minimising approach. 
Related to studies in the fishing literature this also leaves the problem in the 
modelling of the TAC regulation because there is needed to be an explicit dis-
tinguishing between the restricted and the unrestricted firms.  
 
In the present paper the industry is characterised by a combination of restricted 
and unrestricted outputs. This has the implication that the firm is free to choose 
its mix of outputs with respect to the unrestricted outputs, whereas the restricted 
outputs most be treated as fixed. The firm can maximise its revenue with re-
spect to the unrestricted outputs, whereas the restricted outputs most be treated 
as fixed outputs in the revenue maximisation. Moreover it is emphasised that 
given that the restricted and unrestricted outputs are produced in a joint fishery, 
this implies that the output regulation would impact the firms supply of the un-
restricted outputs as well. The fishery that combines the supply of restricted and 
unrestricted outputs describes the situation of the pelagic fishery in the North 
Sea by the Danish trawlers. A fishery that is regulated by individual quota li-
censes on an annual basis. The presence of the vessels specific quotas has the 
advantages in the present context that it is facilitates to identify the firms that 
are restricted by the output regulation.  
5.  The Empirical model 
The present application on the dual approach describes the production condi-
tions of the Danish trawler fleet based on information in the revenue function 
for each of firm that have an individual annual license (quotas) in the herring or  
14 
mackerel fishery. In general, the advantage of using the dual approach lies in 
the flexibility, which is obtained when formulating the functional form of e.g. 
the revenue function. Also, the approach allows the derivation of a consistent 
system of output supply and input demand equations based on simple differen-
tiation, facilitating the use of flexible functional forms. The duality theory 
makes it possible to choose a representation of the technology, which has desir-
able properties for estimation, such as exogenity of the regressors. The use of 
the dual representation of production structure is appropriate given that the be-
havioural assumption of the revenue maximisation is valid in the industry. Fur-
ther, the applied representation of e.g. the revenue function has to meet the 
regularity conditions. The estimation of the dual approach can be based on the 
use of a single equation without any inconsistency, where the regressors are 
treated as exogenous. However, the efficiency of the estimators can be i m-
proved by using the consistent system, which arises when using the output sup-
ply functions derived e.g. from the revenue function. The possible efficiency 
gains occur as a result of the cross equation error correlation but also as a result 
of the equation restrictions imposed by the regularity conditions. 
 
When applying the dual theory to the pelagic fishery, it is assumed that the firm 
base its mix of unrestricted output on the output prices that are determined exo-
genously in the market. The supply of the regulated outputs are treated as exo-
genously given for the firm in the sense that the quantity of the individual quota 
is predetermined by the regulators. It is assumed that the firm chooses its quan-
tity of restricted and unrestricted outputs in order to maximise its revenue, 
whereby the fishing effort is treated quasi-fixed in the short run. In the long run, 
the firm has the possibility to maximise its profit by simultaneously optimising 
its mix of outputs and inputs, the latter implies changes in vessel design, gear, 
equipment and other inputs. However due to the absence of costs data for the 
pelagic trawlers, the present modelling of the production conditions is restricted 
to the short-run, where the inputs are treated as fixed. This implies that the ves-
sel maximise revenue given their characteristics. Moreover, the trip length and 
the fact that trips are planned based on perceived quotas and market prices re-
sults in input mixes that can be viewed as fixed costs. For this study, a vessel 
composite input was constructed (the product of number of trips times the ves- 
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sel size in GRT) based on the assumption that the vessels, or capital, are rela-
tively fixed and thus determine the level of variable input use. To specify the 
revenue function has been chosen the quadratic form which has shown to be 
flexible  in modelling of restricted and unrestricted variables (Dupont, 1991). 
The revenue maximising behaviour, based on exogenous prices on unrestricted 
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Symmetry is imposed by the restrictions aim=ami and bjn = bnj, and  
R is the revenue; 
Pi is the prices of the unrestricted outputs (PR - species for reduction, PC - other 
species for consumption) 
Zj is the composite input fishing effort
6 (GRT*TRIPS) 
Yh is the restricted outputs (YH - herring, YM - mackerel) 
a’s , b’s e’s m’s and g’s are the parameters. 
 
By applying Hotelling’s lemma the output supply for the each unrestricted spe-
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5  The application of the revenue function accomplishes a first stage (short-run) optimisation, 
the profit function is addressed in the second stage (long-run) optimisation, which accom-
plishes optimisation of the inputs. 
6  By employing the composite quasi-fixed input is it assumed separability in the input. Admit-
ting that this is a inadequate measure of the composite input. However, the present definition 
is consistent with the traditional fishing effort used in other studies for example Kirkley and 
Strand (1988).   
16 
 
where Qi is the supply of reduction species and other consumption species, de-
noted by QR and QO. The supply of the licensed species herring and mackerel is 
measured by Y h. The exogenous prices of species for reduction purposes and 
other consumption species than herring and mackerel is denoted by Pm. Finally 
Z denotes the quantity of the quasi-fixed composite input. 
 
The system of the output supply functions forms a theoretical consistent way to 
estimate on the one hand the elasticity between the unrestricted outputs, and on 
the other the spillover effect that the license regulation license would has on the 
unrestricted outputs.  
 
An extension of the present study could be accomplished by estimating the 
profit function and the supply function simultaneously and thereby estimating 
the shadow value of the restricting herring and mackerel licenses. In these sense 
revealing the market price the vessels would be willing to pay for additional li-
cense of herring and mackerel, and thereby the consequence of transforming the 
regulation from a system where licenses was granted gratis to a markets based 
system. Unfortunately due to the circumstance that no cost data is available in 
the present study the opportunity to employ the profit function to estimate the 
shadows value is impossible. Instead the focus in the current analysis is nar-
rowed to employ the system of output supply function to estimate the elastic-
ities described above.  
6.  Data and Estimation 
The Danish Directorate of Fisheries supplies data used in estimation. The model 
has been built on yearly observations given that the regulation applied in the 
pelagic herring and mackerel fisheries is imposed by individual yearly quotas. 
The observations are initially divided between two groups of trawlers. The first 
group contains the trawlers that have obtained yearly licenses in the herring 
fishery, the second group cover the trawlers that both have licenses in the her-
ring and the mackerel fishery. The estimations are applied on yearly observa-
tions, this involves the risk of insufficient price variability. However, given that  
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the regulation is implemented on a yearly basis, this justifies that a significant 
impact of the regulation should be expected within this frequency. The observa-
tions include recorded details of dockside landing quantities and prices as well 
as the number of fishing trips and GRT-capacity of each vessel. The yearly data 
include herring, mackerel, reduction species and other species of consumption. 
It is noted that the reduction catches represent catches of the following fish 
categories: sand eel, Norway pout, sprat, horse mackerel, blue whiting and mis-
cellaneous catches. The category of other consumption species includes: 
shrimp, lobster, whiting, haddock, hake, plaice, cod, sole, saithe and mackerel, 
but the latter species is only included for the trawlers in the first group, as these 
firms have not applied for licenses in the mackerel fishery. The data include the 
vessels’ specific landings distributed on the single species categories. To avoid 
missing observation as a consequence of zero of one of the dependent variables, 
the zero catches of any of the four species were assigned by the arbitrary small 
value of 0.00001 kilo according to Kirkley and Squires (1988). The Gross Reg-
istered Tonnage measures the capital stock and is multiplied by the number of 
fishing trips per year in order to measure the effort intensity of the single vessel 
per year. Summaries of the data used in the study are given in Table 1. 
 
In total data consists of 92 observations of trawlers with an individual herring 
quota in the North Sea/Skagerrak and the vessels operate from the ports of 
Esbjerg, Thyborøn, Hirtshals and Skagen. Some of the trawlers have a quota in 
the mackerel fisheries. The trawlers included operated in the fisheries between 
1994 and 1996.  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics, All 92 Trawlers , Price, Quantities, Year 
Description  Mean  Standard Error  Minimum  Maximum 
Quantity (kg) landed of:  1994
3) 
Herring  2138494  751534  861085  38885248 
Mackerel  50536  635688  0  1880866 
Reduction  528263  1563561  1231643  8347375 
Other  24692  74696  0  416015 
Price (DKK/kg):
1)         
Herring  1.60  0.17  1.00  1.84 
Mackerel  1.10  0.71  0.00  1.78 
Reduction  0.53  0.01  0.47  0.56 
Other  1.36  2.02  0.00  6.56 
GRT- Gross Register  Ton-
nage 
328  142  149  611 
Number of trips   41  17  24  78 
Herring quota   1950848  71870  800000  3353000 
Mackerel quota





Description  Mean  Standard Error  Minimum  Maximum 
Quantity (kg) landed of:  1995 
Herring  1953007  936201  619128  4193249 
Mackerel  380558  467316  0  1655510 
Reduction  6731337  2428056  3352514  14309306 
Other  4151  16996  0  94749 
Price (DKK/kg):         
Herring  1.41  0.14  1.04  1.69 
Mackerel  1.57  1.19  0.00  3.17 
Reduction  0.54  0.03  0.48  0.59 
Other  1.86  3.07  0.00  11.18 
GRT- Gross Register  Ton-
nage 
334  149  149  654 
Number of trips   38  12  24  61 
Herring quota  577722  331760  135000  1056000 
Mackerel quota




Description  Mean  Standard Error  Minimum  Maximum 
Quantity (kg) landed of:  1996 
Herring  1133345  467148  413764  2213382 
Mackerel  353447  340267  0  1143743 
Reduction  5891243  2158473  1055181  9038340 
Other  41270  72979  0  219602 
Price (DKK/kg):         
Herring  1.91  0.19  1.53  2.32 
Mackerel  4.32  1.82  0.00  5.69 
Reduction  0.62  0.01  0.58  0.65 
Other  2.69  3.06  0.00  12.13 
GRT – Gross Register Ton-
nage 
361  137  149  654 
Number of trips   36  15  18  63 
Herring quota   1343464  498447  316000  2014000 
Mackerel quota
2)   488428  200540  112000  742000 
1)  All estimations are conducted using current prices 
2)  Include only the vessels that have a mackerel license. 
3)  The yearly individual quota system was introduced 1
st May 1994. 
 
In Table 1 there is indicated to be large variation on prices for mackerel and the 
category of other species for consumption purpose. The variation in the mack-
erel price could indicate that the impact of the mackerel regulation would differ 
between the years. In the sense that the relative low mackerel price in 1994 
would tend to give a modest supply of mackerel in this year compared to the 
years 1995 and 1996 where the mackerel price is higher and thereby also the 
supply of mackerel. The yearly price variability on mackerel could therefore 
indicate that a higher proportion of the firms are unrestricted in the mackerel 
fishery in 1994 compared to 1995 and 1996. Moreover price variation of other 
consumption species could indicate the existence of aggregation problems due 
to changes in the distribution of species in this category on a yearly basis. An 
obvious way to deal with these annual fluctuations could be accomplished be  
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conducting estimations on annual basis as in Bjørndal and Gordon (1993). Un-
fortunately the yearly estimations would be applied at the cost of reducing the 
degree of freedom, and given the relative low number of observation this is not 
recommendable in the present application. The estimation has therefore been 
accomplished for entire period 1994-1996 for the two separate trawler groups.  
 
Another important theme in the estimation of the supply functions in the regu-
lated industry is to consider whether the firm is restricted in its transformation 
between outputs due to the license regulation. If this is the case the firm’s out-
put of herring and mackerel should be modelled as restricted outputs. On the 
other hand, if regulation not restricts the output supply of the firm it is appro-
priate to model the output transformations by the elasticities between the unre-
stricted output, as in the unregulated industry e.g. outlined in Kirkley and 
Strand (1988). In the latter case, there should be defined output supply func-
tions for herring and mackerel as well rather than restricting their quantities as 
in (6). However, given that the output supply of herring and mackerel is not re-
stricted, the supply functions in (6) could still be employed but the quantities of 
herring and mackerel should be treated as endogenous in the system. In this 
sense employing the supply functions in (6) involve discrepancy between the 
situation where the regulation of herring and mackerel is binding versus not 
binding, because it means that the quantities of herring and mackerel should be 
treated respectively as an exogenous versus an endogenous variable. An obvi-
ous way to deal with the discrepancy would be to estimate the restricted and 
unrestricted vessels separately
7. However, based on the relatively low of num-
ber of observations in the data set, the estimations has been accomplished by 
incorporate the restricted and unrestricted vessels in the same estimation. For 
the vessels that are not restricted in the herring and mackerel fishery the correla-
tion between quantities of herring and mackerel and the error is avoided by 
conducting IV-estimations. To spot the firms that are considered not to be re-
stricted in the herring and mackerel there has been defined an ad hoc rule stat-
ing that a firm that has landed less than 80% of its allowed annual quota is as-
sumed to be not restricted in the herring and mackerel fishery. For the unre-
                                                                 
7  I would like to thank Douglas Larson for this highly relevant suggestion.   
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stricted firms are employed IV-estimation on the supply of herring and mack-
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which are similar to the output supply functions in (6) that are derived from the 
quadratic revenue function expressed in (5). The only difference between (7a,b) 
and (6) is that the catches of all four species (herring, mackerel, species for re-
duction and other consumption) are treated as unrestricted
8 in (7a,b).  
 
The estimation of (7a) is undertaken for vessel that have applied for a license in 
herring fisheries
9, whereas  (7b) is estimated only for the vessels that have 
mackerel license. The IV-estimation is only conducted for the unrestricted ves-
sels, the procedure is conducted by using the predicted quantities of herring and 
mackerel from (7a) and (7b) as input in the supply functions in (6). Based on 
the ad hoc rule it is indicated that 31 firms out of a total of 43 firms are re-
stricted in the herring fishery for the first group. Moreover it is indicated that 
out of the 49 firms in the second group, there are 36 firms that are restricted in 
the herring fishery, whereas 37 vessels are restricted in the mackerel fishery. A 
closer inspection of the restricted vessels in Table 2 show the impact that the 
annual regulation has had on the development of the restricted vessels on  the 
yearly basis. There is seen an annual trend towards a tightening of the mackerel 
regulation between 1994 and 1996, which is indicated by the increased share of 
                                                                 
8   Naturally there is only conducted IV estimations for herring for vessels that have only applied 
for a herring license. For these vessels catches of mackerel is included in the category of other 
consumption species.  
9  These vessels are allowed minor catches of mackerel (for example as by-catches). The catches 
of mackerel for the vessels are included in the catches of other consumption species. The ves-
sels that have only applied for herring licenses in unrestricted in the mackerel fishery, other-
wise they would have applied for a mackerel license.   
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restricted firms in 1996. This development is consistent with the price statistics 
in Table 1 indicating that the increased price of mackerel in 1996 has created 
incentive to increase the output supply of mackerel, whereby a larger share of 
the firms are restricted in 1996. In the herring fishery, there is seen an annual 
trend between 1994 and 1996 towards a more loose regulation for both groups 
of trawlers. It is interesting to note that only 50% of the trawlers in the first 
group are restricted by the herring licenses in 1996, in this sense it is difficult to 
assign whether the fishery should be modelled as restricted or unrestricted in 
this year. 
 
Table 2.  The Percentage of Trawlers Restricted by the Annual Quota Regu-
lation  
   94  95   96 
Trawlers restricted in the herring fishery
1)  94%  69%  50% 
Trawlers restricted in the herring fishery
2)  88%  72%  64% 
Trawlers restricted in the mackerel fishery
2)  65%  72%  86% 
1)
  The first group of trawlers that have applied for a license in the herring fishery 
but not in the mackerel fishery. 
2)
  The second group of trawlers that have applied for licenses in the herring and 
mackerel fisheries. 
 
The data is analysed for heteroscedasticity by applying Glejser tests. The tests 
indicate heteroscedasticity of the form assumed by Parks (1970) in which the 
error variance is proportional to the squared level of input, Z. As a consequence 
the output supply function in (6) is divided by Z according to Squires and Kirk-
ley (1991) (see also Campbell and Nicholl, 1995, 47). The tests also indicate the 
existence of heteroscedasticity due to Yh for the vessels in the first group and Po 
for the vessels in the second group. The heteroscedasticity could be corrected 
by deflating the estimations by respectively Yh and Po. Deflating the data by Yh 
and Po changed the signs of estimated parameters compared to the OLS estima-
tion, this indicates problems of multicollinearity when deflation by Yh and Po. 
The consequence of the heteroscedasticity by using OLS estimator is that the  
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estimators are unbiased but inefficient. As a consequence the input-scaled out-
put supply functions in (6) were estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. 
7.  Results 
The maximum likelihood estimations of the input-scaled output supply func-
tions are presented in Table 3. The estimations indicate different impacts of the 
price components and the regulation components for the two groups of trawlers. 
In the first group, there is lack of significant parameter estimates both with re-
spect to price and the herring regulation. For the second group, there is indicate 
a significant impact from the herring regulation on the supply of species reduc-
tion purpose and a significant price component in the supply of other consump-
tion species.  
 
The insignificant price effect with respect to reduction species for both groups 
could be due to insufficient price variation in the data applied on an annual ba-
sis. In most other applications that describe transformations between output in 
the fishing industry, the price variations are defined per fishing trip or per trip 
on a monthly basis. However, in the present context the price variation is based 
on the annual fluctuation due the fact that the purpose is to draw inference on 
the output regulation that is imposed on an annual basis. Moreover it should be 
emphasised that conducting estimations based on a monthly basis would create 
problems to i dentify whether the seasonal production process is restricted by 
annual license or not. In the present context the set-up that has been designed to 
describe the impact of the annual output license, the estimation has therefore 
been conducted on an annual basis.  
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Table 3.  Parameter Estimates Output Supply Functions
1) for the groups of 
trawlers that have output license in the pelagic fishery  
  Quantity supply of 
  Trawlers having only a her-
ring license 






Reduction  Other 
consumption 
species 
Reduction  Other 
consumption species 
































































Standard errors in parentheses 
(*)  Denotes significant at the 15% level 
*  Denotes significant at the 10% level 
**  Denotes significant at the 5% level 
  Note: Quadratic functional form. Apparent heteroscedasticity required estima-
tion of supply per unit of effort. 
1)  Asymmetric separability is assumed so that inputs are separable from the output, 
but converse separability is not imposed. Separability is assumed with respect to 






The tests on nonjointness in inputs for each trawler group that are presented in 
Table 4 are accomplished as likelihood ratio tests. The null hypothesis of non-
jointness with respect to species for reduction and other consumption species is 
rejected for the trawlers in the second group. This implies that the fishery can 
be characterised as a multispecies fishery in the sense that there are spillover 
effects among the different species. This has the implication that regulators 
should based their management as existed there a fishery of multiple outputs, 
management of a single species would have spillover effects on the other spe-
cies in the joint production (see Hall, 1973). For the first group of trawlers the 
hypothesis of nonjointness in inputs can not be rejected. This implies that spe-
cies for reduction and other consumption are characterised as separate fisheries 
that are characterised by individual production functions. In this sense neither 
of the fisheries are impacted by the regulation of the herring or exogenous price 
impacts of other fisheries. It is therefore legitimated empirically to estimate a 
single production function for each of the unrestricted output independent of the 
herring fishery for the trawlers in the first group (see Shumway, 1983). It most 
be emphasised that the result that nonjointness in inputs can not be rejected is 
an amazing result, because the vessels are characterised to be rather flexible, 
therefore it would be expected to be some degree of substitution between the 
species in the pelagic fishery. However, it should be stressed that there are 
some conditions that could bias the test towards not rejecting the hypothesis. 
Firstly, the modelling on an annual basis could create problems with insuffi-
cient price variability in the data set and thereby bias the test toward not reject-
ing the nonjointness. Merely it is indicated that the large share of unrestricted 
vessels in the first group segment during 1996 could indicate that the fishery is 
not restricted in this year, which would also bias the test for nonjointness. The 
latter condition could be adjusted for by modelling the sub-group of unre-
stricted firms following the lines in the unregulated fishery.  
 
Moreover Table 4 presents likelihood ratio tests of input-output separability in 
all outputs for each of the trawler groups. The hypothesis has the implication 
that the marginal transformation between  outputs is independent of the inputs 
(see Chambers, 1994). In this sense the null hypothesis states that effort man-
agement will not change the firms’ relative quantities of outputs. The null of  
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input-output separability is rejected (gij=0) for both groups of trawlers, this im-
ply that imposed management of the composite input would change the relative 
catch composition of the vessel. This has the implication in a management set-
ting that imposed effort restriction would have different impact on the firms de-
pending on the employed fishing effort. The parameter estimates on fishing ef-
fort in Table 3 indicate that restriction on effort will especially reduce the prod-
uct species output of other consumption species in the first group of trawlers 
and the product specific output of species for reduction purpose in the second 
group.  
 
Finally there is employed likelihood ratio tests to test whether the imposed out-
put regulation have spillover effects on the supply of the unrestricted outputs. 
The test is in line with the previous results that tested the nonjointness in inputs. 
This implies for the first group of trawlers that the production of the unre-
stricted species are not impacted by the fishery of the other species nor is the 
supply of the unrestricted species impacted by the imposed regulation on the 
restricted species. For the second trawler category, the null hypothesis that the 
annual quota regulation does not have any impact on the output supply of the 
unrestricted species is rejected by the data. In this sense the regulator should be 
aware that the imposed output regulation will have consequences for the output 
supply of the unrestricted species as well. The specific consequence of the out-
put regulation on the supply of the unrestricted outputs is analysed in detail by 





Table 4.  LR-Tests of Hypothesis about the Production Technology  
Null Hypothesis  Test Statistic  Critical Value 





Trawler having only a herring license  
Non-jointness in inputs
1)  3.557005  7.81473  3  accept null 
Separability in outputs
1)  17.57948  5.99147  2  reject null 
Regulation zero
1)  3.036595  5.99147  2  accept null 
Trawler having both a herring and a mackerel license 
Non-jointness in inputs
2)  16.65644  11.0705  5  reject null 
Separability in outputs
2)  8.574682  5.99147  2  reject null 
Regulation zero
2)  13.80173  9.48773  4  reject null 
1)  The individual quotas for herring.  
2)  The individual quotas for herring and mackerel. 
 
The estimated parameters in Table 3 are used to calculate the elasticity of inten-
sity and thereby the impact that the output regulation of herring and mackerel 
have of the fishing pattern of the trawlers. The estimated elasticity of intensity 
in Table 5a indicates that the supply of herring and reduction species are found 
to be substitutes for the first group of trawlers, the relationship is significant at 
a=15%. In this sense a tightening of the herring licenses would be compensated 
by an increase the supply of species for reduction purposes by the trawler in the 
first group. The fishery for reduction is a ”buffer” fishery that the trawlers in-
creases in the case of tightening herring regulation. The fishery of other con-
sumption species is on the other hand not a “buffer” fishery for the trawlers. 
The reason being that there is not seen any significant impact from the output 
regulation of herring towards the supply of the other consumption species. The 
trawlers are merely traced to the other consumption species due to a exogenous 
price effect, which is indicated by the significant own-price elasticity (signifi-
cant at a=15%).  
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The conventional elasticities of the unrestricted outputs covering the own-price 
elasticity of species for reduction purposes and the cross price elasticity be-
tween species for consumption and reduction purposes are all insignificant. In 
this sense the period 1994 to 1996 do not indicate any transformation between 
the unrestricted output of the average vessel in the first group.  
 
Table 5a.  Elasticities for regulated and unregulated species in the North Sea 
trawler fishery, 1994-1996  
  Elasticity of changing the 
exogenous variables 
Impact on endogenous 























(*)  Denotes statistical significance at the 0.15 level 
*  Denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level 






Table 5b.  Elasticities for regulated and unregulated species in the North Sea 
trawler fishery, 1994-1996  

































(*)  Denotes statistical significance at the 0.15 level 
*  Denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level 
**  Denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
The elasticities for the second group of trawlers containing the firms that have 
granted licenses in both the herring and mackerel fisheries, are outlined in Ta-
ble 5b. The elasticity of intensity indicates substitution between the regulated 
supply of herring and the species for reduction purposes. The similar relation-
ship was found for trawlers in the first group but it is emphasised that the mag-
nitude and significance of the estimated elasticity is stronger for the trawlers in 
the second group. The elasticity of intensity for the second group of trawlers 
indicates that a 1% decrease in the licenses for herring would be compensate by 
a 0.62% increase catch of species for reduction purpose. In terms of gross in-
come the 1% tightening of the herring output would be followed by a decrease 
in the gross income of 11602 DKK. This is calculated by relating the 21889 ki-
los of herring to a price on 1.61 DKK/kilo to (minus) the catches for reduction 
purposes of 42246 kilos of a price of 0.56 DKK/kilo. It is noted that the impact 
in terms of gross income ignores the impact the change in catch composition 
would have on the profit of the firm due to due the lack of cost data. For the 
first group of trawlers, the 1% decrease in the herring license would lead to a 
decrease in the gross income of 12365 DKK of the average vessel (calculated as 
12927 kilos of herring at a price of 1.66 DKK/kilo minus 15930 kilos of catches  
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for reduction purposes at a price of  0.57 DKK/kilo). In this sense there is found 
similar impact in terms of direct decrease in gross income for the two trawler 
groups. It is noted  that t he calculation on the consequence of gross earnings 
build on the assumption that the trawlers do not have the possibility to use the 
catches of other consumption as a “buffer” to compensation a tightening of the 
herring license. The latter is verified by the insignificant elasticity between her-
ring license and supply of residual species for consumption both trawler groups. 
Another way that the trawlers in the second group could compensate restric-
tions of the herring licenses could exist if the vessels had not fully utilised their 
mackerel license. However the majority of vessels are also found to be re-
stricted by regulation of the mackerel.  
 
The elasticity of intensity with respect to the mackerel, Table 5b does not indi-
cate any substitution or complementary relationship between a tightening of the 
mackerel license and the supplied outputs of species for reduction or consump-
tion purposes. Given that the vessels are not compensating a decrease in the 
mackerel license by increasing landings landing of the unrestricted species for 
reduction or consumption purposes, the fall in gross earnings due a 1% decrease 
would be 21855 DKK (calculated as 7484 kilos of mackerel at a average price 
of 2.92 DKK/kilo). In this sense the vessels would be worse off by a 1% tight-
ening of the mackerel than by a 1% tightening of the herring license in terms of 
gross earnings.  
 
The conventional cross-price elasticities between the unrestricted species for 
reduction and consumption purpose do not show any indication of substitution 
or complementary relationship between the unrestricted outputs for the trawlers 
in the second group. The own price elasticity of other consumption species in-
dicates a significant impact in the sense that a 1% increase in price would be 
follow by 0.95% increase in output supply. In addition it is should be remarked 
that the own-price elasticity of reduction show a negative own-price elasticity. 
This is not consistent with the revenue maximising b ehaviour assumed in 
model. The inappropriate elasticity can presumable be explained by aggregation 
problems in the category that includes the landing of sand eel, Norway pout, 
sprat, horse mackerel, blue whiting and miscellaneous catches. Particular the  
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miscellaneous catches is expected to create problems due to large variation that 
is discovered in the category that probably both contain species for reduction 
and consumption purposes. A reasonable solution would be either to include the 
miscellaneous catches in the category of other consumption or alternative to 
undertake the estimation on yearly basis which would implies the homogeneity 
in the species categories would be i ncreased. Estimating the miscellaneous 
catches has been accomplished but just moved the problem to the category of 
other consumption species. The estimations on a yearly basis has not been ac-
complished due to a relative low number of observations in the analysis
10.   
8.  Conclusion 
Quantitative regulation of fishing output is one of the most used instruments to 
prevent overfishery in the European Union. The paper examines the impact that 
output regulation of selected species would have on the unrestricted species in a 
multispecies fisheries. A complementary relationship between the regulated and 
unregulated species would mean that the output regulation would not only re-
strict the income of the regulated species but would also lead to decline the 
catches of the unregulated species as well. On the other hand a relationship of 
substitution between the regulated an unregulated species would allow the fish-
ermen to compensate a tightening of the output regulation by an increase of the 
unrestricted outputs. In the sense the analysis of the multispecies production 
relations embody information that is essential for regulators to predict how dif-
ferent segments of the f ishing fleet would be impacted economically by i m-
posed output regulation. 
 
By examination of the elasticities between the restricted and unrestricted out-
puts in the pelagic fishery of the North Sea, it is concluded that the output regu-
lation of herring would lead to increased catches of species for reduction pur-
poses in the trawler fleet. Moreover it is found that the output regulation of the 
mackerel fishery have no spillover effects on the unrestricted outputs, in this 
sense a tightening of the license regulation of mackerel would not be compen-
                                                                 
10  I would like to thank Trond Bjørndal for the proposition.   
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sated by increased catches of the unrestricted species. Trawlers that are tied by 
mackerel regulation at the end of the year would given that it is a nonjoint fish-
ery reduce their fishing effort in order to meet the imposed regulation.  
 
The employed annual vessels license has the advantages that it gives the firms a 
high degree of flexibility to plan their harvesting strategies without seasonal re-
strictions. On the other hand, the implemented management system based  on 
gratis licenses might have the potential problem that it attracts the firms to ap-
ply for higher quotas than they plan to use. The reason being that the holding an 
extra unit of quota can be compared to a financial option in the assets market. 
The difference between the financial option and the holding of the license is 
that the former offers a potential to a gain at a certain cost, whereas the latter in 
the implemented regulation system offers a potential gain but free of costs
11. 
The gain of holding an extra quota of herring for the firms could be exercised if 
the firm for one reason or another is restricted
12 in its traditional fishery. This 
means that there is a tendency to overcrowding for the gratis herring licenses. 
However, if some firms are overcompensated with quotas, this would have ex-
ternal consequences for the firms that are restricted by their licenses, because 
they could have obtained larger license, if the overcompensation has been 
avoided. The implemented management system has dealt with the described 
problem by defining that individual quota for the vessel is depending on its 
catches during three previous years. Moreover it is stated in the legislation that 
firms that did not use the license in the present year could be denied a license in 
the year to come, and thereby to punish the firms that do not use their quotas. 
Finally, the management system allows bonus licenses given that the total al-
lowed catches have not been utilised at the end of the year. In this sense the 
management system  seeks to take account of the external effects by allowing 
fishermen that are restricted by the quotas a bonus quota.    
 
An alternative way to deal with the overcompensation of certain license holders 
could be accomplished by introducing license payment ( ITQ), which would 
                                                                 
11   What is meant is that there is no fee to get access to catch an extra kilo of the regulated spe-
cies.  
12  A significant decline in the abundance of unrestricted species.   
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prevent license holders to apply for a large quotas than they need. In this sense 
the quota payment could be seen as an effective way to redistribute licenses 
during the year given that some vessel realised that they for one reason of an-
other will not use their license. Finally the payment system would also have the 
implication that the economic most efficient vessels would be employed in the 
fishery, given this a goal for the politicians.  
 
However, given that the political consensus to agree on individual transferable 
quota system can not be found, the task to distribute the quotas among the fish-
ermen is a ccomplished within the terms of the imposed management system. 
Based on the approach in the present paper the regulators can apply the elastic-
ity between the regulated and unregulated output to describe the impact of im-
posed regulation. In this sense the approach is not only applicable to the fishing 
industry but could also be applied to other industries that consists of regulated 
and unregulated outputs for example the milk quotas applied in agricultural in-
dustry in the European Community.  
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